The aim of the paper is to present evidence that China and India are, and will remain, two very different actors in international negotiations to control global warming. We base our conclusions on historical data and on scenarios until 2050. The Business-as-Usual scenario (BaU) is compared to four Emissions Tax scenarios to draw insights on major transformations in energy use and in energy supply and to assess the possible contribution of China and India to a future international climate architecture. We study whether or not the Copenhagen intensity targets require more action than the BaU scenario and we assess whether the emissions reductions induced by the four tax scenarios are compatible with the G8 and MEF pledge to reduce global emissions by 50% in 2050. 
Introduction
China and India are two Asian giants and global players. They are home to about one-third of the world population and they are both experiencing prolonged periods of high economic growth. China's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has grown at the striking average rate of 9.5% per year from 1990 to 1999; from 2000 to 2009 the expansion of the economy has further accelerated, with an average annual growth rate of 10.5% per year. Double-digit growth rates over twenty years have generated a stunning five-fold increase of GDP per capita in China. India's economic growth has been slower in comparison with China, but still remarkably high during the last twenty years.
1 India's GDP per capita growth rate has been equal to 5% per year, on average, from 1990 to 1999; growth has accelerated in this decade, with an average increase of 7.4% per year from 2000 to 2009. The average Indian citizen is now 2.4 times richer than in 1990. However, despite this unprecedented period of prosperity, she is still three-times poorer than her Chinese counterpart. The economic gap between the two countries has widened over the past twenty years: in 1990 average GDP per capita was twenty percent higher in China than in India, in 2000 it was twice higher and in 2009 three times higher.
Chindia -as many commentators now refer to the two Asian giants 2 -is certainly a useful geo-political construct, but the two countries are still very diverse. The gaps in income, energy use and emissions -both in per capita and in absolute levels -will very likely remain wide for several decades. When discussing the future impact of the two countries' development pattern on global climate change and possible ways to include them in the efforts to contain global warming, we definitely still need to tell a tale of two countries. Often blamed together for not doing enough to reduce their Greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions, China and India have two very distinct historical and future development trajectories.
China's carbon intensity of energy -the carbon dioxide embodied in each unit of energy -was 30% higher than India's in 1990 and still is 23% higher in 2007; the energy intensity of output in China -the energy embodied in each unit of GDP -was 3 twice higher than in India in 1990, 30% higher in 2000 and 45% higher in 2007. As a result, despite a remarkable decline over the past twenty years, the carbon intensity of GDP is today 30% higher in China than in India. All the dynamics of income per capita, of carbon intensity of energy, of energy intensity of GDP and the level of population, explain why China's carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in 2005 were roughly five times higher than India's emissions (6.5 Gt per year in China and 1.2 Gt per year in India). China was responsible for 22% of global carbon dioxide emissions in 2005; India for only 4%. For a comparison, emissions of carbon dioxide from fuel combustion in the United States were equal to 6.4 Gt in 2005, slightly lower than China's emissions; the emissions of Japan were roughly equal to India's emissions, with a total population only one-ninth of the Indian one.
The aim of this paper is to present evidence that China and India are, and will remain, two very different actors on the scene of international negotiations to control global warming. We base our conclusions on historical data from the World Bank Development Indicators and on scenarios developed using the hybrid Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) WITCH. A Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario explores the optimal economic and energy system dynamics without any policy explicitly conceived to reduce GHGs emissions. It is important to stress that the BaU scenario does however implicitly include all the policies that are enacted to respond optimally to changing prices of inputs, both at domestic (capital, labour) and at international level (fuels, investment cost in renewables, knowledge spillovers). Policies whose aim is to increase energy efficiency are therefore implicitly included in the BaU scenario. Policies to reduce GHGs emissions -i.e. by switching from coal to natural gas or to renewablesare instead part of the four Tax Scenarios.
It is by all means unrealistic to expect that either China or India will introduce a tax on GHGs emissions anytime in the near future. We use here the Tax scenarios to illustrate significant issues, similarities and differences, that would emerge as an optimal response to economic and regulatory incentives to reduce GHGs emissions. We focus our attention on the implications that a tax on emissions has on both carbon intensity of energy and energy intensity of GDP, on total GHGs emissions and on the marginal and macroeconomic cost of the climate policy.
China and India have captured the attention of researchers in all disciplines.
Energy and environmental economists are not an exception. Vöhringer et al (2010) , Li (2008) . 3 Pachauri and Jiang (2008) compared the energy transition in China and India at household level and found many significant differences between the two countries.
We complement this growing literature by highlighting those aspects that emerge from the analysis of energy and emissions scenarios for China and India that are relevant for the next rounds of negotiations. The target is not an audience of energy experts or the IAMs community. We rather aim at reaching the diverse community of negotiators and policy makers engaged in promoting actions against global warming at local, national and international level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader to historic data and to the BaU scenario. Section 2 also contains a brief overview of the WITCH model. Section 3 presents the four Tax scenarios. The implications in terms of energy demand, emissions and economic cost in China and India will be discussed thoroughly. Conclusions follow.
Historic data and the BaU scenario
In this Section we merge historical data and future scenarios to sketch a profile of China and India that highlights crucial issues for future negotiations on climate change.
Scenarios on future economic growth, energy use and carbon emissions were generated using the hybrid Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) WITCH -World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model (Bosetti et al 2006; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni 2007; Bosetti et al 2007; witchmodel.org) . 4 Key characteristics of WITCH are (1) an economic growth engine that allows the study of economic development over long time 3 Recently, the Integrated Assessment Modelling community has gathered to discuss long-term energy and emissions scenarios for Asian economies in the Asia Modelling Exercise. However, a whole set of new scenarios will not be published until the end of 2011. 4 By combining the economy, energy, ecosystems and climate, IAMs allow the creation of scenarios on future GHGs emissions and the study of transition pathways towards a low-carbon world. For a discussion of key characteristics and use of IAMs see, among others, Dowlatabadi (1995) , Ackerman et al (2010) and Weyant (2010 
Economic growth
China and India start from two very different levels of economic development.
China is a major world economy with a GDP three times higher than the GDP of India The Economy CO2 Emissions : 1960-2005 historic data aggregated by the World Bank Development Indicators. Fossil fuel comprises coal, oil, petroleum, and natural gas products (source: International Energy Agency). Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels (source: International Energy Agency). Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement (source: CDIAC). GDP at purchaser's prices data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2000 official exchange rates (Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files). Population data is from a variety of sources, midyear estimates. 2020-2050 data are from the WITCH model Business-as-Usual scenario. Table 1 . Historic data and future scenario on the economy, energy system and emissions.
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Notes
It is therefore clear that, for many years to come, China and India will accept to pay only a minimal fraction of the global cost to reduce GHGs emissions. This is not equivalent to saying that China and India will not contribute to the mitigation target. It rather suggests that high income countries need to pay for a large fraction of emissions reductions in China and India.
2.2.
Energy intensity and carbon intensity 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2005, in India by only 1.5% per year. Carbon intensity of energy has increased in both countries, but in India almost twice as fast as in China (+2.1% and +1.1% per year, on average). 6 The increase of emissions per unit of energy has been particularly strong in India due to a long-term decline of traditional biomass as a source of energy. 7 The increase of the carbon intensity of energy has been so strong in India, that it more than compensated the energy efficiency gains, causing an overall increase of carbon emissions per unit of GDP (at an average rate of 0.5% per year). In China, instead, the carbon intensity of GDP has declined at an average 3.5% per year.
8 However, China started from a much higher level of energy content per unit of output and despite the relatively better performance, China still has 26% more carbon emissions per unit of energy and 7% more energy use per unit of GDP than India. As a result, the carbon intensity of GDP is 34% higher in China than in India.
In the BaU scenario the carbon intensity of energy continues to grow in both countries, faster in India than in China, with the two countries converging to similar levels in 2050. The energy intensity of GDP is instead declining in both countries, at similar rates. China's development path will remain relatively more intensive in energy use: in 2050 the carbon content of each unit of GDP is going to be 34% higher in China than in India, exactly as in 2005. Compared to other world regions, China and India will continue to have energy and carbon intensity higher than the average. The gap with the world average disappears in 2050, but a large difference remains with respect to OECD economies, which continue to be much more efficient and less carbon intensive than China and India (see Table 1 ).
Energy demand and emissions
The scale of the two Asian giants is so big that any efficiency gain is more than India's demand for energy is growing, but its demand is still one third less than China's.
The gap between the two countries will remain substantially unchanged in percentage terms, but will become huge in absolute terms: China will consume about 3,300 Mtoe more than India in 2050, twice the present level of energy use in China. China will absorb 25% of global energy supply, India "only" 8%. Again, this tells a story in which both countries are expected to become giants of future global commodities markets, but
China will be in a totally different position from India.
In both countries energy consumption per capita is substantially lower than in 
A tale of two countries
The differences between the Chinese and the Indian development pattern are summarized in Figure 4 . We report the combination of all GHGs emissions per capita Table 1 ). It is therefore unfair, to treat these two countries equally in the next rounds of negotiations. Further elements that suggest a differential treatment between China and India in international negotiations are discussed in Section 3, when we present four alternative emissions tax scenarios. The official pronouncements made in Copenhagen sparked an intense debate to assess whether China and India's promises implied explicit action to reduce GHGs emissions or whether their emission reduction targets will be achieved as part of the BaU development pattern. As mentioned above, the BaU pattern does not exclude decisions to increase energy efficiency or to expand carbon-free energy sources, that are taken for the national interest, not for slowing down climate change.
The Copenhagen pledges
According to our BaU scenario the carbon intensity of the economy will decline by 57% in China and by 45% in India. The emissions intensity (including all GHGs) 9 China also committed to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020 and to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from the 2005 levels. The emissions from the agriculture sector will not be part of the assessment of emissions intensity of India. See Carraro and Massetti (2010) Figure 5 . Nine out of fifteen models expect that China will achieve the -40% target in the reference scenario, with the median exactly at -40%. Eight out of twelve models expect that India will achieve the -20% target in the reference scenario, with the median lying at -33%, well below the target. This does not mean that the two targets will come at no cost. Rather, it implies that the two countries' pledges appear to be part of national strategies to reduce the energy intensity of the economies for domestic reasons. With a stable, or slightly increasing carbon content of energy, these domestic commitments deliver also carbon intensity reductions. Reduced emissions come as an unintended side effect of domestic energy policy. 10 The reduction of carbon intensity is calculated using WITCH's 2005 base year. There are differences between our base year and data for 2005 displayed in Table 1 due to different sources. Therefore Table 1 implies different rates of carbon intensity reductions.
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The tax scenarios
In this Section we explore scenarios in which policy measures are explicitly taken to reduce the level of GHGs emissions in China and India. We focus on four emissions tax scenarios and we assume that the same tax applies to all GHGs, in all world regions.
It is not realistic to assume that either China or India, or both, will introduce taxes on The emissions tax is obtained by solving the model imposing a global pattern of emissions that is consistent with the 2100 concentration target and allowing countries to trade emissions allowances internationally to equate marginal abatement costs. We then run the model imposing the carbon price as a tax, thus avoiding complex distribution issues. This concentration target is equivalent to a temperature increase of 2.5°C above the pre-industrial level with median probability in 2100, well above the stated objective of keeping temperature increase below the 2°C. 12 WITCH is a perfect foresight model. The level of future taxation influences present decisions. Therefore it is optimal to smooth the transition to a regime of emissions taxes in WITCH. This explains why emissions decline with respect to the BaU before 2020 in Figure 7 and However, the realism of this level of taxation in both countries is highly questionable and casts doubts on the possibility to achieve the global target set forth by G8 and MEF 13 The reference year for the emissions cuts is not clear. We use here 2005. An alternative would be 1990. Using the BaU as a reference would imply emissions levels not coherent with the 2°C target.
14 If the -80% target is valid for Annex I countries Non-Annex I countries must reduce emissions by 22%. If the -80% target is valid only for G8 countries, Non Annex I countries must reduce emissions more.
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countries. 
China India
The energy sector
The transformations induced by climate policy can be grouped into two major categories: those increasing energy efficiency and those decreasing the carbon content of energy. WITCH produces scenarios with the optimal mix of action along these two trajectories ( Figure 9 ). The sufficiently high detail of the energy sector also allows the study of the optimal mix of alternative energy technologies (Table 2 ). What are the transformations needed in the power sector and in the energy system as a whole to bring along the much needed contraction of the carbon content of energy in a climate policy scenario? Table 2 
Marginal and total costs
What are the marginal and total costs of reducing emissions in China and how do they compare with each other? Figure 10 and Figure 11 present information on these important aspects.
The first message is that marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) are timespecific in long-term IAMs. The economy, the technology, the cost of fuels, all change as time goes by and they affect the cost of reducing emissions. Technical progress in carbon-free technologies is a major driver of MACCs. Learning-by-doing and learningby-researching will reduce the cost of installing and operating wind mills, for example. Notes: Costs are expressed as the ratio between the discounted sum of GDP losses with respect to the BaU scenario and cumulative discounted GDP in the BaU scenario. Two alternative discount rates are used. Source: WITCH model. Total costs of emissions reductions are displayed in Figure 11 . We consider macroeconomic costs, which take into account the fact that tax revenues are rebated lump-sum economy-wide. Costs therefore emerge as a consequence of a sub-optimal allocation of resources in the economy (not considering the environmental damage).
Costs are gross of the economic benefits from limiting climate change and are expressed as a ratio between discounted GDP losses and BaU discounted GDP. Discount rates of 3% and 5% are used.
The four emissions taxes scenarios generate much higher costs in China than in India. This is explained by the larger area under the Chinese MACCs displayed in Figure 10 for any level of taxation -i.e. China's contribution to the global public good is higher than India's contribution. The information on the slope of MACCs and on the total cost of climate policy thus reveals that a hypothetical international agreement that fixes the same percentage reduction of emissions for both China and India would be preferred by China. India would instead reject an international agreement that fixes the same taxation level as in China. 
Conclusions
In this paper we use historical data and future scenarios produced by the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH to highlight the many differences between the two Asian giants. China and India are too often cited together in the climate change debate. However, although some similarities do exist -a large population and booming economies above all -they are two very different countries in many respects.
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There is first a problem of scale: China's carbon dioxide emissions -the most important among all Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) -were four times higher than India's emissions in 2005, and our Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario says that in 2050 they will still be 3.5 times higher. Second, there is a problem of equity: India is expected to achieve China's same level of emissions per capita not earlier than 2050 and China will have a GDP per capita three times higher than India at least until 2050, according to our BaU scenario. Therefore it is neither realistic, nor fair, to expect these two very different countries to make similar engagements in climate change negotiations.
All the differences that we highlight in historical data and in the BaU scenario are magnified by a hypothetical tax on GHGs emissions. In all the four scenarios examined, China appears to be more responsive to climate policy than India. India has relatively high abatement costs and requires very high levels of taxation to reduce its emissions below the 2005 level. In our highest tax scenario China would reduce its total GHGs by 35% with respect to 2005, while a 50% emissions increase would be optimal for India.
More importantly, despite all the emphasis that surrounds the remarkable economic performance of both countries, China and India remain two relatively poor countries if compared to richer economies: in 2050, after a prolonged period of growth China's GDP per capita is expected to be only one-third of the average GDP per capita in OECD countries; India's GDP per capita will only be one-tenth. It is therefore extremely unlikely that both countries will accept binding stringent emission reductions targets in the next two or three decades. The Copenhagen pledges of China and India confirm their -comprehensible -reluctance to contribute to global emissions reductions.
Indeed, emissions intensity targets appear to be part of a national strategy to increase energy efficiency rather than part of a deliberate plan to reduce global warming.
China and India, in particular, are therefore likely to remain marginal players in the fight against global warming for still some time. A realistic commitment would be in line with the lowest level of taxation that we have examined. A set of domestic policies that establishes an implicit or explicit tax on all GHGs equal to 10 US$ per tonne of CO 2 -eq in 2020 and then increases to 50 US$ in 2050 would cut global emissions by 8% in 2050. Even if the price of emissions is the same in the two countries, India would abate less GHGs than China and thus suffer lower costs, in this scenario.
However, this "politically feasible" commitment from China and India would clash against the G8 and MEF target of reducing global emissions by 50% in 2050, which would require -even if accounting for an equitable distribution of emissions reductions -a much greater effort from both countries. If rich economies really want to maintain their promises they need to provide massive financial aid to China and in particular to India.
